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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, : 
Plaintiff-Appellee, : Case NO.900274-CA 
v. : 
DANILO PASCUAL, : Category No. 2 
Defendant-Appellant. : 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
This appeal is from a conviction for criminal homicide, 
murder in the second degree, a first degree felony, in violation 
of Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-203 (1990). This Court has jurisdiction 
to hear the appeal pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(j) 
(Supp. 1990), as the appeal was transferred from the Utah Supreme 
Court on May 18, 1990. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
1. Whether the trial court committed plain error when 
it failed to give an eyewitness identification jury instruction. 
The requirements for finding plain error, as contained in State 
v. Eldredge, 773 P.2d 29, 35 (Utah), cert, denied, Eldredge v. 
Utah, 110 S.Ct. 62 (1989), are 1) that the error be obvious to 
the trial court, and 2) that the error be harmful. 
2. Whether trial counsel provided ineffective 
assistance when he 1) failed to request an eyewitness jury 
instruction, 2) failed to object to a jury instruction negating a 
self-defense justification, and 3) pursued a certain theory of 
the case and abandoned a certain line of questioning. The test 
for determining whether counsel's conduct was constitutionally 
infirm, as contained in State v. Pursifell, 746 P.2d 270, 275 
(Utah Ct. App. 1987), is 1) whether counsel's performance fell 
below an objective standard of reasonable professional judgment, 
and 2) whether counsel's performance prejudiced defendant. The 
standard for reviewing the wording of jury instructions is 
whether the trial court abused its discretion. State v. Aly, 782 
P.2d 549, 550 (Utah Ct. App. 1989). The choice of which jury 
instruction the trial court gives is a legal conclusion which is 
reviewed under a correctness standard. State v. Mitchell, 779 
P.2d 1116, 1123 (Utah 1989). 
3. Whether the trial court abused its discretion and 
committed prejudicial error when it refused to admit evidence of 
a fire allegedly set to defendant's house two days after the 
homicide. The standard of review is whether the court abused its 
discretion in denying admission of the evidence, and whether any 
error was harmful. State v. Larsen, 775 P.2d 415, 419 (Utah 
1989). 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES 
The language of the provisions upon which the State 
relies is included in the body of this brief. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
On June 27, 1988, defendant was charged with one count 
of criminal homicide, murder in the second degree, a first degree 
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felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-203 (1990) (Record 
[hereinafter R.] at 1). Gary Gale originally appeared as counsel 
for defendant but withdrew and Robert Phillips substituted as 
counsel at the time of the preliminary hearing (R. at 12). 
An October 31, 1988, trial setting was continued by 
stipulation of the parties (R. at 62). The matter came on for 
trial by jury on December 6, 7 and 8, 1988, in the Second 
Judicial District Court for Weber County, the Honorable Stanton 
M. Taylor, district judge, presiding (R. at 65-68). During 
trial, defendant attempted to introduce evidence of a fire which 
allegedly occurred at defendant's house two days after the 
homicide with which defendant was charged (Transcript 
[hereinafter T.] at 311). Counsel for the State objected and, 
after an in-chambers discussion, the court sustained the 
objection (T. at 316). The court determined that the probative 
value of the evidence of a fire, which the court described as 
"limited," was substantially outweighed by its unduly prejudicial 
nature (T. at 315-16). Defendant did not ask the court to 
instruct the jury on eyewitness identification. It is unclear 
whether defendant objected to the instructions prior to their 
being given to the jury. There is a brief allusion to the 
instructions in the transcript, but any discussion of the final 
form of the instructions is not provided (T. at 576-78). After 
the jury was instructed, defense counsel said that he had no 
challenges to the jury instructions (T. at 624). 
At the conclusion of the trial, the jury found 
defendant guilty as charged (R. at 109 and 159). On January 3, 
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1989, the court sentenced defendant to a term in the Utah State 
Prison of not less than five years and which may be for life, 
with a consecutive one year enhancement for use of a firearm. 
The court also ordered defendant to pay restitution (R. at 123-
24). 
On February 17, 1989, defendant filed a pro se notice 
of appeal (R. at 131). By stipulation, the case was remanded 
from the Utah Supreme Court to allow resentencing of defendant in 
order for a timely notice of appeal to be filed (R. at 136-40). 
Defendant was resentenced on August 28, 1989, and filed a notice 
of appeal from that resentencing on September 19, 1989 (R. at 
148-51). The appeal was transferred to this Court from the Utah 
Supreme Court on May 18, 1990. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
In June of 1988, Todd Salazar, his girlfriend, Natalie 
Chase, and their infant son, T.J., lived in a house on 33rd 
Street in Ogden, Utah (T. at 91-92 and 97). Todd worked during 
the day as a bricklayer, and Natalie worked nights at the Nice 
Corporation; they shar€*d baby tending chores, each caring for the 
child when the other was at wrork (T. at 93-94). On Friday, June 
24, 1988, Todd got home from work at 3:30-4:00 p.m. and Natalie 
left for work at 9:30 p.m. (T. at 97). When Natalie returned 
from work at 2:30 a.m., she went next door to a birthday party, 
leaving Todd and T.J. at home (T. at 98-99). The child was 
asleep and Todd and a friend were up watching television until 
approximately 4:30 a.m., when Natalie came back from the party 
(T. at 99). The two went to sleep for about three hours, 
awakening at about 9:00 a.m. (T. at 100). 
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Natalie decided to go boating with family members about 
noon on Saturday, June 25, 1988. Todd stayed home because he was 
tired (T. at 100). T.J. was taken to Todd's parents' home; Todd 
was sleeping on the couch in the front room when Natalie left (T. 
at 101). Todd was wearing a hat and cut-off sweat pants with no 
shirt, shoes or socks when Natalie last saw him (T. at 104). The 
sweat pants had a small pocket in the back which would hold very 
little (T. at 105). 
Approximately 8:00 p.m. on June 25, 1988, two 18-year 
olds, Jerry Garza and Jaime Gomez, were visiting a friend in a 
house near defendant's home (T. at 116 and 492). Neither was 
related to Todd Salazar; both knew him, although not well (T. at 
115 and 187). Todd was three or four years older than they (T. 
at 115). Jerry and Jaime decided to drive to a convenience store 
(T. at 116-17 and 176). As they passed defendant's home, 
Franklin and Lawrence Lucero and two friends were sitting on 
defendant's porch. The Luceros recognized Jaime and Jerry and 
began yelling at them (T. at 117 and 176). There had been bad 
blood between Jerry and the Luceros prior to that night (T. at 
182). As Jerry and Jaime drove by, Lawrence remembered that 
Jerry had beaten up one of Lawrence's cousins. Lawrence began 
shouting at Jerry, calling him names and telling him to stop and 
fight (T. at 447). Jerry and Jaime just drove on by (T. at 117 
and 176). 
Jerry and Jaime returned from the store, again driving 
past the Luceros and their friends at defendant's house (T. at 
118-19 and 177). Lawrence called out to Jerry and Jaime, telling 
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them to stop and calling them out to fight (T. at 119-20 and 
177). Jerry and Jaime felt outnumbered by the Luceros and their 
friends, so they went on to Jaime's uncle's house and told the 
three men there that the Luceros wanted to fight (T. at 119-20 
and 177-78). Jerry and Jaime asked Jaime's two uncles and their 
friend to return with them to back them up in a fight with the 
Luceros (T. at 120, 155, 178 and 204). Jerry left to drop off 
the car and asked four or five other friends at another house to 
come to the fight as well (T. at 178). At that point no one in 
Jerry and Jaime's group had any weapons (T. at 178). 
As the nine or ten people with Jerry and Jaime 
approached the open field near defendant's house, they saw people 
jumping off of defendant's porch and going to their cars (T. at 
120). Jerry saw one of Lawrence's friends go to Lawrence's car, 
"[get] into the trunk," then walk over to Lawrence (T. at 179-
80). When he saw this, Jerry assumed that Lawrence was then 
armed with a knife or a pipe (T. at 180). Jerry went to his car 
and got out a knife and another friend got a bat (T. at 180). 
Jerry walked toward the field with the knife held behind his back 
(T. at 181). Evidently, others in the neighborhood became aware 
of the pending fight and gathered at the field (T. at 233 and 
269-70). 
As Jerry and Jaime walked toward the Lucero group, they 
were met by Lawrence and Franklin Lucero and two of their 
friends, Ranaldo Hain and Crisostomo Mendoza (T. at 120, 411 and 
469). At this point, defendant was in his house. He heard the 
noise of the groups calling each other on, and looked out to see 
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his four friends walking toward a group of ten others (T. at 494-
96). Defendant did not know any of the ten but saw a knife and a 
bat; he decided to get his sawed-off shotgun from the closet (T. 
at 497-500). Defendant said that he took the gun and one shell 
out to stop the fight and scare off the group opposing his 
friends (T. at 500-501). It is clear from the testimony that 
neither Todd, Jerry, Jaime, or any of their friends knew 
defendant, who was some fifteen years older than they (T. at 145, 
159, 197, 239-40, 271 and 519). Defendant did not know Todd, 
although defendant's friend, Lawrence Lucero, did (T. at 501-502 
and 415-16). 
While defendant was in his house getting his shotgun, 
the Luceros and their friends were standing in the nearby open 
field egging Jerry and Jaime on, calling them on to fight (T. at 
183). The verbal taunts were boiling down to a one on one fight 
between Lawrence and Jerry, with their friends and other 
onlookers urging them both to drop their weapons and fight hand 
to hand (T. at 121, 158-59, 184, 236 and 451). It is at this 
juncture that the evidence produced by the State and that 
produced by defendant diverges. The prosecution's witnesses 
placed Todd Salazar across the street on the porch and lawn of 
his own home until defendant and his friends crossed the street 
and began beating him. Defendant's witnesses said that Todd 
walked across the street and joined in the fight in the open 
field. The State's version of the evidence follows first. 
During the verbal sparring between the Luceros and 
Jaime and Jerry, Jon Martinez left the field and walked across 
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the street to talk to the victim, who was sitting on the porch of 
his home, smoking (T. at 206-207). Martinez had just come to 
watch the fight and went over to ask Todd if Todd was going to 
come to watch, too (T. at 207). Todd answered that he wasn't, 
saying he had something cooking and would stay at his house (T. 
at 207-208). Martinez walked back to the corner of the street 
and listened to the two groups in the field argue (T. at 208). 
When the two factions were arguing in the field, urging 
Jerry and Lawrence to fight without weapons, Lawrence said that 
his group did not have weapons (T. at 159). At that point, 
Jaime's uncle, Rumaldo Gomez, spied defendant, who was walking 
from his house and up to the Luceros through the bushes (T. at 
159-60). Rumaldo saw that defendant had his hand behind his back 
and said that defendant had a gun (T. at 160-61). Defendant 
pulled the gun out, cocked it, and said "[Y]eah, . . . I got a 
gun" (T. at 161). Defendant pointed the gun at Rumaldo and 
Johnny Gomez, who immediately turned and ran across the street, 
in the direction of the victim's house (T. at 161-62, 169, 184-
85, 210, 239-40, 275-76, and 507). The whole crowd began to run 
from defendant, escaping down the street, through Todd's yard, 
running in every direction (T. at 125, 277 and 507). No punches 
were thrown until after the gun was displayed and defendant and 
his friends had chased the others across the street to Todd's 
house (T. at 122, 127, 210-11 and 240-42). 
As the Gomezes and the neighborhood boys ran from 
defendant down the alley near Todd's house, they saw Todd for the 
first time (T. at 123, 126, 187, 233-35, 241-42, and 277). Todd 
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stood at his house, looking confused as all the young men ran 
past (T. at 242). 
Jaime Gomez, running from defendant, had crossed the 
street and reached the corner of Todd's carport when Todd stepped 
off of his porch (T. at 127). Two of the men from the Lucero 
group, Cris Mendoza and defendant, ran across to where Todd was, 
near the porch, and began to kick and hit him (T. at 127, 212, 
and 242). Todd tried to defend himself by hitting back (T. at 
212). When Jaime saw the two men fighting with Todd, he turned 
back to help him. Jaime hit one of the men and Todd started 
running toward his house (T. at 128). Cris Mendoza originally 
was fighting "toe-to-toe" with Todd when defendant came up behind 
Todd and hit Todd with the gun (T. at 128-29). Todd had a set of 
car keys in his hand; he did not have a knife (T. at 129). Jaime 
ran back to where defendant, Cris, and Todd were fighting and 
struck either defendant or Cris with his fist; Todd ran toward 
his house. Todd had not reached the porch when defendant or Cris 
jumped him again. At that point, Jaime noticed the gun and 
warned Todd about the weapon (T. at 130). 
Jaime ran toward the alley with Todd right behind him. 
This path lead them to the carport and away from defendant and 
the gun (T. at 130-31). Jaime got around Todd's car in the 
carport, and turned to see that defendant and Cris were no more 
than five feet behind Todd (T. at 131). Jaime saw defendant 
point the gun at Todd's back; Jaime turned to run again and heard 
a shot. Jaime looked back and saw Todd fall. Jaime ran to the 
alley where he told the others who had run that Todd had been 
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shot; everyone ran back from the alley (T. at 132). When Jaime 
came out of the alley, he saw Todd lying on the ground with a 
hole in his back, and Cris and defendant moving back across the 
street (T. at 133). Jaime tried to help Todd but nothing could 
be done (T. at 134). 
Others who had run from defendant saw defendant and 
Cris attack Todd and Todd try to defend himself. They could see 
that Todd did not have any weapons and that he had no pockets in 
which to conceal a weapon (T. at 212). Jonny Martinez heard the 
shot as he ran toward where Todd was fighting with defendant. At 
the sound, Martinez looked up to see Todd fall forward on his 
face (T. at 213). Defendant then walked up to where Todd lay, 
called him an "F'ing punk," and hit Todd on the right forehead 
with the gun. Defendant then ran back across the street (T. at 
214-25). Martinez told his friends to call an ambulance, then 
tried to keep Todd breathing until authorities arrived (T. at 
216-17). 
One witness who was not involved in the argument at the 
open field next to defendant's house was Marcy Rodriguez. She 
lived next door to Todd and saw him standing on his front porch 
while the argument was going on across the street from her house 
(T. at 279-80). She never saw Todd cross the street to the 
argument (T. at 282). She did see that the argument never turned 
to blows, "They just argue" (T. at 281). She saw the men 
(defendant and Cris) chasing the boys across the street to the 
corner where Todd lived (T. at 281 and 535-36). She also could 
see defendant's gun as he crossed the street (T. at 282). 
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When the police officers arrived, they found Todd lying 
near his car with a wound in his back (T. at 287). A search of 
the area turned up no weapons (T. at 287 and 298). Natalie 
Chase's father received word about 9:30 p.m. that Todd had been 
shot (T. at 302). He went to Todd's house where he saw the outer 
door standing ajar; he entered and found food on the coffee table 
in the front room, and the television set on (T. at 303). He 
turned off the television and secured the house (T. at 304). 
Officers were directed to defendant's house by the 
young men at Todd's house. They performed a consent search and 
found no one and no weapon in the house (T. at 292-93). Some 
three hours later, after defendant surrendered himself at the 
police station, officers returned to defendant's home and found 
an eight inch knife in a garbage can outside of the house, and a 
twenty to twenty-four inch 2 x 2 thrown under a truck in 
defendant's driveway (T. at 299-300 and 307-308). The officers 
never located the shotgun used by defendant (T. at 309). 
At the time he was shot, Todd was wearing only cut-off 
sweat pants, underpants, and athletic shoes (T. at 377). The 
gunshot wound in Todd's back showed stippling from the gunpowder, 
and the wad and about forty pellets from the shell were found in 
Todd's chest cavity (T. at 328 and 381). Expert testimony 
established that the muzzle of the gun was approximately two to 
three feet from Todd's back when the shot was fired (T. at 382, 
393 and 570). The wound was seven and three quarter inches from 
the base of Todd's neck and slightly to the right of the middle 
of his back (T. at 378). The shot traveled from the right back 
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to the left chest, passing through the left lung and portions of 
the heart (T. at 380). The wound and trajectory were consistent 
with a shot fired horizontally as Todd was turning away (T. at 
382 and 394). Todd had abrasions above the right eyebrow, 
consistent with Martinez's testimony that defendant hit Todd with 
the shotgun after Todd was lying on the ground (T. at 383, 385 
and 215). Todd had other fresh injuries, consistent with the 
testimony of being kicked and punched prior to the time he was 
shot (T. at 384-89, 127-28, 211-13 and 242-43). 
The autopsy also showed that Todd had a blood alcohol 
content of .04 milligrams percent; this was consistent with 
having consumed "a little more than half a can of Utah beer." 
(T. at 397). Todd also had a quantity of cocaine and its 
metabolite in his blood and urine. The blood amounts were 
••fairly low" and the urine amounts higher. Based on that, the 
medical examiner concluded that ingestion of the cocaine had 
taken place "at least hours before [Todd's] death" (T. at 398). 
He testified that the alcohol and the cocaine would work against 
each other in their effects because alcohol is a depressant and 
cocaine is a stimulant (T. at 398-99). 
In sometimes confusing and contradictory testimony, 
defendant and his friends painted a different picture of Todd's 
involvement that evening. Defendant's friend, Ranaldo Hain, said 
that the Lucero brothers, Ranaldo, and another friend, Crisostomo 
Mendoza, faced a crowd of twenty or more (T. at 409 and 411). 
Lawrence Lucero told the group that he just wanted to fight Jerry 
Garza (T. at 412). Just then, someone threw a beer can at 
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Crisostomo (Cris), and defendant and Cris began fighting with the 
victim and the person who threw the can (T. at 412). Ranaldo 
said that Todd was with the person who threw the can, on the 
sidewalk at the street corner next to the open field during the 
argument (T. at 412-13). As the four fought, defendant pulled up 
the gun, loaded it, and the other boys began running (T. at 413). 
Ranaldo and Lawrence stayed on 33rd Street as the fight somehow 
moved across the street to Todd's house (T. at 414-18). As the 
fight continued at Todd's house, Martinez told Lawrence, "that's 
Todd, and Lawrence said — then Lawrence recognized him and was 
going to try to break it and then the gun went off." (T. at 
415). Todd was Lawrence's friend (T. at 415-16). When the 
shotgun went off, Todd was trying to get into his car; Ranaldo 
thought that this explained the fact that Todd was shot in the 
back (T. at 417). 
On cross-examination, Ranaldo gave a confusing account 
of where and how the fight started. His identification of Todd 
as the person standing on the sidewalk when the beer can was 
thrown was tenuous. The following exchange between the 
prosecutor and Ranaldo occurred: 
Q [By Mr. Richards] Okay. But Todd — you 
remember seeing Todd Salazar standing there? 
A He was — yeah, he was standing next to 
that guy [the one who had thrown the can]. 
Q Now, do you know Todd Salazar? 
A I seen him before, but I didn't remember 
him that day. 
Q Okay. But you remember him now and that 
was the person standing there? 
A Yeah. 
(T. at 431). The testimony was also confusing about where 
Ranaldo was standing and the movements of the groups just before 
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and during the fight (T. at 431, 433, 435, 436 and 438). It is 
also confusing about when Ranaldo first saw defendant's gun, and 
when, in the course of the fight, defendant loaded it (T. at 432-
38). 
Lawrence Lucero testified that Todd was a friend of his 
and that Lawrence tried to break up the fight when he saw that 
defendant was hitting Todd (T. at 450, 453, 455, and 463). 
Lawrence confirmed that he held only sought to fight with Jerry 
Garza when he and his friends went into the field (T. at 450). 
When Lawrence and his friends walked out to fight, there were 
twenty to twenty-five people facing them across the field, some 
standing in the field and others on the sidewalk (T. at 450-51). 
Lawrence and Jerry were prepciring to fight when someone threw a 
beer can at Cris and "it all broke out." Defendant ran to Cris, 
who was facing two people (T. at 451). Lawrence first saw Todd 
across the street, in the gutter, fighting with Cris and 
defendant (T. at 452). He n€*ver saw Todd with a weapon (T. at 
452). He did see defendant with the shotgun in the field before 
the fighting started. Defendant loaded the gun when defendant 
saw Cris fighting and ran to help him (T. at 452-53). Lawrence 
saw defendant and Todd fighting on Todd's carport and saw 
defendant swing the gun at Todd (T. at 454). Lawrence thought 
Todd had stopped fighting when defendant swung the gun and it 
discharged (T. at 455 and 462-63). 
Crisostomo Mendoza testified that he had gone into the 
field with Lawrence and the others as a back up (T. at 470). He 
saw defendant when "the man threw me a beer" and the fight 
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started (T. at 472). Cris did not see the gun at first, but then 
later saw it as defendant raised it into the air (T. at 473-74). 
After the gun was shown, the people facing defendant began 
running away (T. at 474 and 481). Cris did not see Todd, did not 
know Todd, and did not know if the person fighting defendant was 
the person who was shot (T. at 474-75). Cris testified: 
Q [By Mr. Phillips] And do you know who 
Todd is? 
A No, sir. 
Q Do you know the person who got shot? 
A No, sir. 
Q Okay. Did you see the person Danny 
[defendant] was fighting with? 
A Yes, sir. 
Q And do you know if that was the person who 
got shot? 
A I don't know, sir. 
Q Did you see anyone with a knife then when 
Danny was fighting? 
A Yes, sir. 
Q Who? 
A I saw some sharp object, you know, Todd 
starting to swing to Danny and Danny, you 
know, tried to swing the gun to some guys, 
you know. 
Q Could you see, you said, a sharp thing? 
What did you say? 
A Sharp object. 
Q Sharp — do you know if it was a knife or 
not? 
A I'm not sure, you know. 
Q A set of keys maybe? 
A No. He tried to swing, you know. I don't 
know. 
(T. at 474-75). Cris did not know if the man who was shot was 
the same man that had the sharp object (T. at 477 and 483). 
Defendant testified that he did not know Todd Salazar 
and had nothing against him; however, when he saw Todd that 
evening, he thought Todd did not look like himself (T. at 493 and 
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504). In the early evening, the Lucero brothers, Ranaldo Hain, 
Cris Mendoza and defendant's "lady" were all at defendant's 
house, drinking and talking (T. at 492-93). Defendant was inside 
the house when Jerry and Jaime drove by, but he did hear yelling 
from outside (T. at 494). He eventually stepped outside and saw 
his four friends walking across the field toward a group of about 
ten people on the opposite sidewalk (T. at 495-96). Defendant 
did not see any weapons with his friends but saw a knife and a 
baseball bat in the other group (T. at 495 and 497). Defendant 
went back into his room and took out his sawed-off shotgun and 
one shell (T. at 497-98 and 500-501). He said that he took the 
gun out to stop the fight and scare the others away; however, he 
admits that he carried the gun behind his body as he walked out 
of his house and followed his friends into the field (T. at 501 
and 506). 
When defendant got up to his friends, they stood only a 
short distance from the other ten people (T. at 501). Defendant 
saw Todd standing with second group of ten people who had 
gathered at some point (T. at 501-502). The people who had 
gathered were neighborhood people (T. at 521). Todd, whom 
defendant did not even know, was "yelling and saying some bad 
words" (T. at 502). Defendant thought Todd was really drunk (T. 
at 504). Defendant's attention was drawn to Todd and defendant 
was never aware that a beer can had been thrown at Cris. 
Defendant saw his friends run toward the other group, and he ran 
too (T. at 505). All this time, defendant held the gun behind 
him. When asked, "[I]f you're holding the gun that way, how can 
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you stop the fight or scare everybody away if you're hiding the 
gun?" (T. at 506) • Defendant responded: 
A Okay. I didn't — I didn't hide the gun. 
The gun is really showing about that much and 
that you can see it. 
Q [By Mr. Phillips] Well, why is it behind 
you at all? 
A I don't — I really don't know, but — I 
just don't know why —why it's in my — 
behind my back, but the thing that I know, 
it's in my back and it's showing about that 
much and they can see it. 
Q Okay. Then what do you do with it? 
A Okay. When — when the fight was 
starting — when the fight was starting I 
pull it — I pull it and I point it — I 
point it in the air. 
(T. at 506-507 and 528). When defendant pulled the gun into 
view, someone yelled, "He's got a gun," and the crowd began to 
run away (T. at 507 and 531). Defendant loaded the gun when the 
person with Todd kicked defendant in the knee (T. at 507-508). 
Defendant advanced toward the sidewalk where the 
opposing group of people had been and loaded the gun as the boys 
were running away (T. at 532-33). Cris ran toward Todd to chase 
him and defendant followed (T. at 535-36). Defendant said that 
he and Cris fought with Todd as they moved across the street to 
Todd's carport (T. at 540). Defendant swung the gun at Todd 
because Todd was swinging at him with a butterfly knife which had 
a six inch blade and a six inch handle (T. at 512 and 537). Todd 
never struck defendant with the knife, but defendant struck Todd 
with the shotgun (T. at 513-15, and 541-44). Defendant thought 
that Todd was really drunk, which explained why he continued to 
fight against defendant who carried the shotgun (T. at 543). 
When defendant hit Todd with the gun, Todd turned; defendant 
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swung the gun again and it fired (T. at 515, 545 and 549), 
Defendant had said in his statement to police that he fired from 
about five feet away; at trial, he testified that he was close 
enough to Todd to strike him with the gun (T. at 548-49). 
On rebuttal, James Gaskill from the Weber State Crime 
Lab testified that he conducted test firings of sawed-off 
shotguns with barrel lengths ranging from eighteen to twenty-six 
inches (T. at 569-70). These tests demonstrated that the 
distance from the gun muzzle to Todd was two to three feet when 
the gun was fired (T. at 570). The position of the body and the 
angle of the wound and the trajectory indicated that the shot 
came from on the carport or from out on the lawn a foot or two 
(T. at 572). 
Todd and Natalie did not have any guns and the only 
knife located in the house was a paring knife (T. at 106). When 
Natalie returned to the house the day after the shooting, she 
found the paring knife where she had left it in the kitchen sink 
on Friday (T. at 113). She also found a blanket and pillow on 
the couch where Todd had been sleeping, and a plate with a 
jalapeno pepper and salt on the table in front of the couch (T. 
at 110). Next to the plate was a can of beer which had been 
opened but was still full (T. at 113). In the kitchen was a full 
bowl of spaghetti on the kitchen counter (T. at 110). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The trial court's failure to give a Telfaire-Long 
eyewitness identification jury instruction was not plain error. 
That instruction is mandated when the identification of the 
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perpetrator is at issue; it is not applicable to the present 
case. Defendant admitted to police and testified at trial that 
he was the one who shot Todd Salazar. An eyewitness 
identification instruction, such as that dictated by State v. 
Long, 721 P.2d 483 (Utah 1986), was not appropriate; consequently 
it was not error, let alone plain error, for the court not to 
have given that instruction. Other instructions given 
sufficiently advised the jury of the law regarding the 
credibility of witnesses and their ability to perceive and 
correctly recall the events surrounding the shooting. 
Defendant's trial counsel did not provide ineffective 
assistance. Because the eyewitness identification instruction 
from Long was not applicable to this case, it was not deficient 
performance for counsel not to have requested the instruction. 
Neither was defendant prejudiced when the instruction was not 
requested. He admitted shooting the victim; his defense was that 
the gun fired accidentally, or that he was acting in self-
defense. A Long instruction would not have altered the outcome 
of the trial. 
Trial counsel was also not ineffective for failure to 
object to jury instruction no. 10. That instruction was a 
correct statement of the law and counsel's performance cannot be 
deficient for failing to object to a correct instruction. Even 
if the instruction had been erroneous, defendant was not 
prejudiced by it. The credible evidence was that defendant shot 
Todd in the back from a distance of approximately five feet. The 
credible evidence also demonstrates that the victim was not 
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involved in the fighting until defendant and one of his friends 
entered the victim's property and attacked him. Todd was unarmed 
and trying to escape defendant's attack when he was shot. A jury 
instruction which parroted the statute regarding self-defense 
would not have changed the outcome of this trial. 
The last ineffectiveness claim is also without merit. 
Counsel did not, as defendant now claims, abandon his theory of 
the case mid-trial. Based on defendant's own testimony, he 
either accidentally shot Todd, or shot him in self-defense. 
While it is not totally clear what theory of the case defense 
counsel supposedly abandoned, it appears that the theory 
defendant now claims was that the victim was killed as part of a 
gang war. As the trial court determined, the fact that Garza or 
Gomez may have been part of a Hispanic gang was not material if 
defendant was not aware of the gang affiliation. When 
defendant's counsel became aware that defendant could not testify 
whether he knew of a gang association at the time of the 
shooting, counsel prop€*rly did not pursue that avenue. Again, 
defendant was not prejudiced even if his counsel's trial actions 
were deficient. There was no evidence that the victim was part 
of a gang; in fact, the evidence supports the opposite 
conclusion. If defendcint was fearful of a gang affiliation, that 
fact lost its impact when it became clear that defendant chased 
the supposed gang members across the street with a shotgun. When 
defendant attacked Todd Salazar, whose affiliation with the 
alleged gang was not demonstrated, in Todd's own yard, then shot 
Todd in the back as he was trying to flee, any alleged fear of a 
gang was irrelevant. 
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Finally, the trial court did not abuse its discretion 
when it refused to admit testimony that defendant's home had been 
set on fire two days after the shooting. That evidence was 
irrelevant to the issues of the homicide. At most, it bolstered 
defendant's testimony as to why he ran away after the shooting. 
That testimony did not need bolstering, as the jury could accept 
that defendant ran because he was afraid and confused. The 
evidence of the fire clearly did not justify the shooting itself. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
IT WAS NOT ERROR FOR TRIAL COUNSEL TO NOT 
REQUEST, AND THE TRIAL COURT NOT TO GIVE, AN 
EYEWITNESS IDENTIFICATION JURY INSTRUCTION. 
Defendant's first claim of error is that it was 
manifest error for the trial court not to give an eyewitness 
identification jury instruction pursuant to State v. Long, 721 
P.2d 483 (Utah 1986). As a corollary, he alludes to his second 
claim of error, i.e., trial counsel provided ineffective 
assistance for failing to request such an instruction. That 
second claim will be addressed in Point II. 
When an issue is not properly preserved at the trial 
level, an appellate court may nonetheless address the issue under 
the plain error doctrine. This is provided for by rule in the 
context of jury instructions. Utah R. Crim. P. 19(c) (1990). In 
State v. Verde# 770 P.2d 116 (Utah 1989), the Utah Supreme Court 
said: 
[When] faced with a claim that a 
particular assertion of instructional error 
not raised at trial should be considered on 
appeal because failure to do so would result 
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in manifest injustice under Utah Rule of 
Criminal Procedure 19(c), we will determine 
whether to review such a claim of error under 
the same standard we use when determining the 
presence of plain error under Utah Rule of 
Evidence 103(d). 
770 P.2d at 122. In State v. Eldredqe, 773 P.2d 29 (Utah), cert. 
denied, Eldredqe v. Utah, 110 S.Ct. 62 (1989), the Utah Supreme 
Court, construing rule 103(d), Utah Rules of Evidence, stated: 
The first requirement for a finding of plain 
error is that the error be "plain," i.e., 
from our examination of the record, we must 
be able to say that it should have been 
obvious to a trial court that it was 
committing error. . . . The second and 
somewhat interrelated requirement for a 
finding of plain error is that the error 
affect the substantial rights of the accused, 
i.e., that the error be harmful. 
773 P.2d at 35 (citations and footnote omitted). Under this 
test, the trial court's failure to give an eyewitness 
identification instruction was not plain error. Such an 
instruction was not applicable to this case because defendant's 
identification was not an issue. 
The Utah Supreme Court, in State v. Long, directed: 
that in cases tried from this date forward, 
trial courts shall give such a[ Telfaire] 
instruction whenever eyewitness 
identification is a central issue in a case 
and such an Instruction is requested by the 
defense. 
721 P.2d at 492 (emphasis added). The instruction mandated by 
the Court is patterned after the case of United States v. 
Telfaire, 469 F.2d 552 (D.C. Cir. 1972). The Telfaire case 
addressed the "need for a special instruction on the key issue of 
identification," and cited a series of United States Supreme 
Court cases "focusing on the very real danger of mistaken 
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identification as a threat to justice." 469 F.2d at 555 
(emphasis added). The Long case also specifically applied to 
addressing "the weaknesses inherent in eyewitness 
identification." 721 P.2d at 490. All of the Utah cases at 
which a Telfaire-type instruction was sought, both pre- and post-
Long, specifically describe the issue as one of eyewitness 
identification. See, e.g., State v. McCumber, 622 P.2d 353, 359 
(Utah 1980); State v. Schaffer, 638 P.2d 1185, 1187 (Utah 1981); 
State v. Reedy, 681 P.2d 1251, 1253-54 (Utah 1984); State v. 
Malmrose, 649 P.2d 56, 61 (Utah 1982); State v. Watson, 684 P.2d 
39, 40 (Utah 1984); State v. Bingham, 684 P.2d 43, 45 (Utah 
1984); State v. Tucker, 709 P.2d 313, 316 (Utah 1985); State v. 
Booker, 709 P.2d 342, 346 (Utah 1985); State v. DeJesus, 712 P.2d 
246, 247 (Utah 1985); State v. Jonas, 725 P.2d 1378, 1380-81 
(Utah 1986); State v. Quevedo, 735 P.2d 51, 52 (Utah 1987); State 
v. Remington, 737 P.2d 168, 169 (Utah 1987); State v. Branch, 743 
P.2d 1187, 1190 (Utah 1987), cert, denied, Branch v. Utah, 485 
U.S. 1036 (1988); State v. Griffiths, 752 P.2d 879, 881-82 (Utah 
1988); State v. Stilling, 770 P.2d 137, 143 (Utah 1989); State v. 
Bruce, 779 P.2d 646, 652-53 (Utah 1989). 
Defendant now asks this Court to extend the Long 
holding to require a trial court to give the Long eyewitness 
identification instruction in all cases where eyewitnesses 
testify about the facts of the case. Such testimony does not 
trigger the need for a cautionary Long instruction if the 
identification of the perpetrator is not an issue. As the Utah 
Supreme Court has said: 
-23-
A criminal defendant is entitled to have a 
jury instructed on his theory of the case if 
there is any substantial evidence to justify 
such an instruction. . . . [A] defendant is 
not entitled to an instruction which is 
redundant or repetitive of principles 
enunciated in other instructions given to the 
jury. The principal points of defendant's 
proposed instruction dealt with the state's 
burden of proof and the factors to consider 
in weighing the testimony of an eye-witness. 
All of these factors were adequately dealt 
with in other instructions presented to the 
jury by the trial court. As a result, we 
cannot agree that the denial of the proposed 
instruction constituted reversible error. 
State v. McCumberf 622 P.2d at 359. 
In the present case, defendant apparently claims that a 
cautionary instruction should be given any time an eyewitness 
testifies, whether the issue is one of identification or not. As 
is clear from the testimony given in the present case, different 
people perceive the same events differently. It may also be that 
the perception is the same, but, for whatever reason, a witness 
may testify falsely about what occurred. The end result is that 
a jury is given evidence which is contradictory. However, as the 
Utah Supreme Court said in State v. Buel, 700 P.2d 701 (Utah 
1985): 
The fact that there was contradictory 
testimony, without more, is not grounds for 
reversal, State v. Watts, Utah 675 P.2d 566, 
568 (1983). "The conflicting evidence was 
before the jury, and it was the jury's 
responsibility to evaluate its significance. 
State v. Wulffenstein, Utah, 657 P.2d 289, 
292 (1982), cert. denied, 460 U.S. 1044 . . . 
(1983). 
700 P.2d at 703 (additional citations omitted). If a jury is 
properly instructed as how to evaluate conflicting testimony, a 
cautionary eyewitness identification instruction (in a non-
identification case) is not required. 
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In the case now before the Court# the jury was fully 
instructed as to its responsibility to determine the credibility 
of the witnesses and to reconcile conflicting evidence (R. at 73, 
88, 89, and 91; copies of these instructions are attached as 
Addendum A). A cautionary eyewitness identification instruction 
was not applicable to this case. Defendant reported to the 
police station a few hours after the shooting and admitted that 
he was the one who fired the shot (T. at 307 and 548). Defendant 
also testified at trial that he was the one who fired the fatal 
shot (T. at 515, 545, and 548-49). Clearly, identification of 
the perpetrator was not an issue in this case. Accordingly, the 
Long eyewitness identification instruction was not applicable and 
it was not plain error for the trial court to not give the 
instruction. 
POINT II 
TRIAL COUNSEL DID NOT PROVIDE INEFFECTIVE 
ASSISTANCE. 
Defendant contends that his trial counsel provided 
ineffective assistance on three bases: 1) Counsel failed to 
request a Long eyewitness identification instruction; 2) Counsel 
failed to object to jury instruction no. 10; and 3) Counsel 
abandoned his theory of the case at mid-trial because counsel had 
failed to adequately investigate this case before trial. 
This Court addressed the issue of ineffective 
assistance of counsel in State v. Pursifell, 746 P.2d 270 (Utah 
Ct. App. 1987), in which it said: 
In Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 
. • . (1984), the United States Supreme Court 
established the standard for determining 
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claims of ineffective assistance of counsel 
at trial. To prevail, the defendant must 
demonstrate, first, that counsel's 
representation fell below an objective 
standard of reasonable professional judgment, 
and second, that counsel's performance 
prejudiced the defendant. Id. at 690 . . . . 
The Utah Supreme Court has adopted and 
interpreted the Strickland standard for 
determining ineffective assistance claims. 
See, e.g., State v. Frame, 723 P.2d 401 (Utah 
1986). 
746 P.2d at 275 (parallel citations omitted). Interpreting the 
test from Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984), the Utah 
Supreme Court said: 
Defendant must prove that specific, 
identified acts or omissions fall outside the 
wide range of professionally competent 
assistance. 
Furthermore, any deficiency must be 
prejudicial to defendant. . . . To be found 
sufficiently prejudicial, defendant must 
affirmatively show that a "reasonable 
probability" exists that, but for counsel's 
error, the result would have been different. 
We have defined "reasonable probability" as 
that sufficiemt to undermine confidence in 
the reliability of the verdict. 
State v. Frame 723 P.2d 401, 405 (Utah 1986) (footnote omitted). 
Applying this test to the present case, it is clear that 
defendant has not demonstrated that his counsel's performance was 
defective or that defendant was prejudiced by that performance. 
A. Counsel Was Not Deficient for Failure to Request 
an Eyewitness Identification Instruction. 
As noted in Point I, an eyewitness identification 
instruction was not applicable to the present case because 
defendant's identification as the perpetrator was not an issue. 
Since the instruction was not applicable, trial counsel's 
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performance was not deficient for failing to request the 
instruction. 
B. Trial Counsel Was Not Ineffective For Failing 
to Object to Jury Instruction No. 10. 
Defendant's next contention is that his trial counsel 
provided ineffective assistance when counsel failed to object to 
jury instruction no. 10. In passing, defendant also alleges that 
giving instruction no. 10 was plain error; however, defendant 
does not analyze this issue under the plain error doctrine. Utah 
Rule of Criminal Procedure 19(c) reads: 
No party may assign as error any portion 
of the charge or omission therefrom unless he 
objects thereto before the jury is 
instructed, stating distinctly the matter to 
which he objects and the ground of his 
objection. Notwithstanding a party's failure 
to object, error may be assigned to 
instructions in order to avoid a manifest 
injustice. 
Although defendant's trial counsel did not object to instruction 
no. 10, defendant could have now challenged the instruction under 
rule 19(c). However, it was not error for the court to use 
instruction no. 10, because the instruction was not a 
misstatement of the law. Even if it were error, under the test 
cited in State v. Eldredqe, 773 P.2d 29, 35 (Utah), cert, denied, 
Eldredge v. Utah, 110 S.Ct. 62 (1989), as discussed in Point I, 
the error was not plain, nor was it harmful. Since the 
instruction was not a misstatement of the law, it was not plain 
that giving the instruction was error. As will be further 
developed below, the instruction, if error, was harmless at best. 
In general, 
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[t]he trial court has a duty to instruct the 
jury on the law applicable to the facts of 
the case. Encompassed in this duty is the 
right of the defendant to have his theory of 
the case presented to the jury in a clear and 
understandable way. 
State v. Potter, 627 P.2d 75, 78 (Utah 1981). While instructions 
are often couched in statutory language, it is not required that 
they be so. As the Utah Supreme Court said in State v. Clayton, 
646 P.2d 723 (Utah 1982): 
[IInstructions need not be given with any 
particular words or phrases. Rather this 
Court has warned that care must be taken 
". . .to use language which the jury would 
understand ....'• State v. Garcia, 11 Utah 
2d 67, 71, 355 P.2d 57, 60 (1960)[ cert. 
denied, Garcia v. Utah, 366 U.S. 970 (1961)]. 
646 P.2d at 725. More recently, the Court said: 
Instructions generally ought to be drafted 
with a view to assisting the jury to 
understand the issues they have to decide. 
Too often instructions simply repeat arid, 
dense statutory language that the trial judge 
does not relate concretely to the issues in a 
case. 
State v. Standiford, 769 P.2d 254, 266 (Utah 1988). The standard 
for review of the wording of jury instructions is whether the 
trial court abused its discretion. State v. Aly, 782 P.2d 549, 
550 (Utah Ct. App. 1989). The choice of which jury instruction 
the trial court gives is a legal conclusion which is reviewed 
under a correctness standard* In State v. Mitchell, 779 P.2d 
1116 (Utah 1989), the Utah Supreme Court said: 
[W]e accord [a] trial court's legal 
conclusion no particular deference on review 
and instead appraise it for correctness. 
779 P.2d at 1123 (citation omitted). 
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The analysis of the propriety of a certain instruction 
does not end with a finding that the instruction was erroneous. 
[A] criminal conviction is not reversed 
because of an erroneous jury instruction 
unless the error is of such gravity that it 
could cause substantial prejudice to 
defendant's rights. A reasonable probability 
of a more favorable result for defendant in 
the absence of such error must exist. 
State v. Montague, 671 P.2d 187, 190 (Utah 1983). Thus, the 
harmless error standard is applied if a court determines that an 
instruction given was incorrect. 
In defendant's brief, he titles this issue as one of 
ineffective assistance and of plain error; however, he only 
analyzes the issue as ineffective assistance. Under this 
analysis, if the jury was properly instructed or if an erroneous 
instruction did not prejudice defendant, trial counsel's failure 
to object to the instruction was not ineffective assistance. 
On the last day of trial, defense counsel proposed two 
jury instructions, one regarding defense of persons or property, 
and one regarding use of force in defense of persons which is 
virtually identical to Utah Code Ann. § 76-2-402 (1990) (R. at 
97-100). On the first day of trial, the State submitted several 
proposed instructions (R. at 101-106). One of these instructions 
was given as instruction no. 10 (R. at 102). Defendant's theory 
that he acted in defense of himself or another was contained in 
instruction no. 13, which reads: 
Conduct which is justified is a defense to 
prosecution for any offense based on the 
conduct. The defense of justification may be 
claimed when the actor's conduct is in 
defense of persons or property under the 
circumstances described as follows: 
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A person is justified in threatening or in 
using force against another when and to the 
extent that he reasonably believes that such 
force is necessary to defend himself or a 
third person against such other's imminent 
use of unlawful force; however, a person is 
justified in using force which is intended or 
likely to cause death or serious bodily 
injury only if he reasonably believes that 
the force is necessary to prevent death or 
serious bodily injury to himself or to a 
third person or to prevent the commission of 
a forcible felony. 
A person is not justified in using force 
under the circumstances listed above if he 
initially provokes the use of force against 
himself with the intent to use force as an 
excuse to inflict bodily harm upon the 
assailant. 
(R. at 85). This instruction is a virtual restatement of Utah 
Code Ann. § 76-2-402(1) and (2)(a).1 It is also virtually 
That statute reads, in pertinent part: 
(1) A person is justified in threatening 
or using force against another when and to 
the extent that he reasonably believes that 
such force is necessary to defendant himself 
or a third person against such other's 
imminent use of unlawful force; however, a 
person is justified in using force which is 
intended or likely to cause death or serious 
bodily injury only if he reasonably believes 
that the force is necessary to prevent death 
or serious bodily injury to himself or a 
third person, or to prevent the commission of 
a forcible felony. 
(2) A person is not justified in using 
force under the circumstances specified in 
paragraph (1) of this section if he: 
(a) Initially provokes the use of 
force against himself with the intent to 
use force as an excuse to inflict bodily 
harm upon the assailant; or 
(b) Is attempting to commit, 
committing, or fleeing after the 
commission or attempted commission of a 
felony; or 
(c) Was the aggressor or was engaged 
in a combat by agreement, unless he 
withdraws from the encounter and 
effectively communicates to such other 
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identical to the first three paragraphs of defendant's proposed 
jury instruction (R. at 99). 
Instruction no. 10 was requested by the State, and 
reads: 
You are instructed that in any prosecution 
for criminal homicide it shall be no defense 
to the prosecution that the defendant was a 
party to any duel, mutual combat, or other 
consenual [sic] altercation, if during the 
course of the duel, combat, or altercation 
any deadly weapon was used. 
(R. at 81 and 102). Defendant complains that this instruction is 
a misstatement of the law because it does not parrot the language 
of Utah Code Ann. § 76-2-402(2)(c). 
Jury instructions do not have to be couched in the 
exact language of a statute. State v. Standiford, 769 P.2d 254, 
266 (Utah 1988). The trial court is obligated to give a correct 
statement of the applicable law to the jury. Id. at 264. Jury 
instruction no. 10 appears to come from statutory and case law 
that preceded the current criminal code; this case law has never 
been overturned. The law of justification in the context of a 
homicide once provided: 
Homicide is excusable in either of the 
following cases: 
(1) When committed by accident and 
misfortune in doing any lawful act by lawful 
means, with usual and ordinary caution and 
without any unlawful intent. 
(2) When committed by accident and 
misfortune in the heat of passion, upon any 
sudden and sufficient provocation or upon a 
sudden combat, when no undue advantage is 
Cont. person his intent to do so and 
the other notwithstanding continues or 
threatens to continue the use of unlawful 
force. 
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taken nor any dangerous weapon used and when 
the killing is not done in a cruel or unusual 
manner. 
State v. Johnson, 112 Utah 130, 185 P.2d 738, 741 (1947) (quoting 
Utah Code Ann. § 103-28-8 (1943)). In the Johnson case, the Utah 
Supreme Court quoted the definition of "combat" as: "A fight, a 
contest, a struggle for supremacy, a duel . . . . " 185 P.2d at 
742 (quoting Webster's New International Dictionary, Second 
Edition). It appears, then, that instruction no. 10 came from 
Utah law as it read prior to the present statute, and from the 
Johnson case as it interpreted a former statute. 
Although the current statute does not use the same 
language as the previous statute, the current statute encompasses 
the same theory. Instead of couching the justification in the 
use of a deadly weapon during the course of mutual combat, the 
current statute uses broader terms. The present statute reads, 
in pertinent part5 
[A] person is justified in using force which 
is intended or likely to cause death or 
serious bodily injury [i.e., a deadly weapon] 
only if he reasonably believes that the force 
is necessary to prevent death or serious 
bodily injury to himself[.] 
(2) A person is not justified in using 
force under the ciarcumstances specified in 
paragraph (1) of this section if he: 
(c) Was the aggressor or was engaged in 
a combat by agreement, unless he withdraws 
from the encounter and effectively 
communicates to such other person his 
intent to do so and the other 
notwithstanding continues or threatens to 
continue the use of unlawful force. 
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Utah Code Ann, § 76-2-402, Under present law, use of a deadly 
weapon is not justified when defendant was the aggressor or 
engaged in combat by agreement (mutual combat). This is the law 
as stated in instruction no. 10. 
Present law adds a qualifier to that statement of the 
law, which is missing from instruction no. 10. However, 
defendant has not argued that the lack of that qualifier was 
error; he has only argued that the language about use of a deadly 
weapon in mutual combat not being a defense was a misstatement of 
the law (Brief of Appellant [hereinafter Br. of App.] at 19-20). 
As noted above, that language is included in the broader language 
of the present statute, and is not error. Furthermore, there was 
no evidence adduced at trial which would support giving the 
qualifying language as an instruction. As noted above, "[t]he 
trial court has a duty to instruct the jury on the law applicable 
to the facts of the case." Potter, 627 P.2d at 78 (emphasis 
added). Since the facts of the case did not support an 
instruction about defendant withdrawing from a fight, the court 
had no duty to instruct regarding withdrawal. State v. 
Moritzsky# 771 P.2d 688, 692 (Utah Ct. App. 1989). 
Since instruction no. 10 was not erroneous, especially 
when read in conjunction with instruction no. 13, it was not 
deficient performance for defendant's trial counsel not to object 
to the court giving that instruction. 
C. Counsel's Conduct of Defendant's Case Did 
Not Deny Defendant Effective Assistance. 
Defendant argues that his counsel provided ineffective 
assistance when his counsel failed to investigate the case 
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properly prior to trial, and subsequently abandoned his theory of 
the case in mid-trial. Defendant does not explain with 
specificity what investigation was not done, or how a different 
investigation would have changed the outcome of his trial. The 
main thrust of his argument was that his counsel began the trial 
focusing on supposed gang associations between the victim and 
Garza and Gomez and their friends, on one side, and defendant and 
his friends on the other side. This was somehow tied to defense 
counsel's statement regarding abandonment of evidence of 
defendant's state of mind. It is also somehow tied to a claimed 
failure by counsel in applying the rules of evidence to provide 
foundation for entering evidence of the alleged gang 
associations. 
The right to the effective assistance of counsel is 
based on the right to a fair trial. Strickland v. Washington, 
466 U.S. 668, 686 (1984). The inquiry as to whether counsel's 
performance was deficient "must be whether counsel's assistance 
was reasonable considering all the circumstances." 466 U.S. at 
688. As the United States Supreme Court said: 
No particular set of detailed rules for 
counsel's conduct can satisfactorily take 
account of the variety of circumstances faced 
by defense counsel or the range of legitimate 
decisions regarding how best to represent a 
criminal defendant, Any such set of rules 
would interfere with the constitutionally 
protected independence of counsel and 
restrict the wide latitude counsel must have 
in making tactical decisions. 
. . . 
Judicial scrutiny of counsel's performance 
must be highly deferential. 
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[A] court must indulge a strong presumption 
that counsel's conduct falls within the wide 
range of reasonable professional assistance; 
that is, the defendant must overcome the 
presumption that, under the circumstances, 
the challenged action "might be considered 
sound trial strategy." 
466 U.S. at 688-89 (citations omitted). 
The actions of trial counsel now complained of by 
defendant did not fall below the standard of reasonable 
professional assistance. Whether Todd Salazar belonged to a 
Chicano group while defendant belonged to a Philippino group i 
not material to the outcome of this case. If defense counsel 
began the trial on the premise that defendant feared for his 1 
because the victim belonged to a rival gang, that fact is not 
clear. Counsel's opening statement, in pertinent part, reads; 
Counsel [for the State] told you about 
these two groups. I think she neglected to 
tell you that the evidence will be that with 
Mr. Pascual and his friends there were five 
of them. The other group, little group she 
refers to, the evidence will be there was 25 
or 27. 
She neglects to tell you that Mr. Garza or 
Mr. Gomez is the president of the Central 
City Cholos. She neglects to tell you that 
there were knives and guns and baseball bats 
in the 27 people that came just to watch the 
fight and to protect the back of the parties 
involved. 
Other people observe a confrontation between 
Danilo and the other fellows and the 
Chicanos, the Central City Cholo Group, so it 
isn't a matter of walking on the scene. 
Counsel will suggest to you that he's [the 
victim] kind of an innocent bystander, and I 
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suggest to you he was swept into this gang 
fight as he came out. I don't know if he 
belonged to the gang or not, but Danilo's 
sitting at his house on his porch with a lady 
he lives with and doesn't have anything 
against any of these people except as swept 
into a rumbles with a disproportionate number 
of people who are armed and with weapons, 
(T. at 73-74, 76 and 77-78). Nothing in this opening statement 
suggests that the mention of a possible gang affiliation had any 
other purpose than to prejudice the jury against the victim and 
the State's witnesses. Defense counsel did not propose a theory 
to the jury that defendant was justified in shooting Todd Salazar 
because Todd belonged to a gang. Counsel's theory was that two 
groups of people faced each other to fight and defendant waved 
his gun around to scare away the group facing his friends. 
Counsel's theory was that Todd had a knife and fought with 
defendant (T. at 77). This theory was never abandoned by 
counsel. 
Defendant's claim that his trial counsel abandoned his 
theory of the case contains a misleading partial quote from the 
transcript (Br. of App. at 22-23). At the conclusion of opening 
statements, the prosecution objected to defense counsel's 
allusion to gang affiliations (T. at 79). After some discussion, 
counsel and the court determined that evidence of such an 
affiliation would be appropriate if the proper foundation were 
laid, and if there was a showing that defendant was aware of the 
affiliation (T. at 81). At the close of the State's case, the 
prosecutor again raised the issue of defendant introducing 
evidence of a gang affiliation. At that point, defense counsel 
said: 
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I'm not sure that I'm — I've talked to my 
client further since the motion came up and 
he's not sure as of the time he advised — I 
was advised these people — that he's not 
sure of his state of mind at the time, so I'm 
not sure. I would be willing to abandon it 
rather than get into any further issue on it. 
(T. at 404). Taken in the context of the earlier agreement that 
defendant would have to show that he was aware of the gang 
affiliation before it would be relevant, the above statement by 
counsel appears to be that defendant could not say that he knew 
of the affiliation at the time of the shooting. Since counsel 
could not establish that defendant knew of the affiliation (which 
was a prerequisite to admission of the evidence), counsel 
properly abandoned that line of evidence. 
Neither was defendant prejudiced by the failure to 
introduce evidence of a gang affiliation. If, as it appears, 
defendant was not aware of the affiliation, he could not have 
been fearing that affiliation when he armed himself and chased 
his opponents across the street with a shotgun. If he did not 
know that Garza, Gomez and their friends were members of a gang, 
he could not argue that he feared for his life and the lives of 
his friends at the hands of the gang members• Defense counsel's 
decision not to pursue a line of testimony about the victim's 
possible gang affiliation was not only proper trial strategy, it 
was the only avenue open after defendant apparently was unable to 
tell when defendant knew of the supposed affiliation. Hence, it 
did not display ineffective assistance. 
Defendant's use of the rules of evidence to argue that 
counsel was ineffective for not urging admission of gang 
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testimony based on those rules is unavailing. If defendant had 
no knowledge of the gang affiliation, evidence of it would not be 
probative of any issue at trial. If the evidence had no 
probative value, it was excludable under rule 402, Utah Rules of 
Evidence (1990) (quoted in Point III). Defendant's argument that 
two of the State's witnesses should have been questioned about 
their gang membership in order to establish a motive to 
misrepresent under rule 406, Utah Rules of Evidence, is without 
merit. Gang membership does not automatically make a person a 
liar; neither does it automatically establish bias or prejudice. 
Any remote probative value it might have had is completely 
outweighed by the prejudicial effect such evidence might have. 
Consequently, it would have been excluded under rule 403, Utah 
Rules of Evidence (1990) (quoted in Point III). 
As part of trial strategy, defense counsel propounded 
theories of defense which were based on defendant's testimony, 
which presumably defendant had told counsel before trial. The 
theories were that defendant either fired on Todd in self-
defense, or that the gun accidentally was cocked and then 
accidentally discharged, shooting Todd. Those theories were 
followed consistently at trial by counsel. The alleged gang 
affiliation evidence was not material to those theories. If 
defendant now feels that the theory should have been that he was 
protecting himself and his friends from a gang assault, defendant 
should have tailored his statements to his attorney and his 
testimony at trial along those lines. Such second-guessing of 
trial counsel's strategy, strategy which presumably was based on 
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what defendant told counsel before trial, is condemned under the 
Strickland-Frame test of effective assistance of counsel. 
POINT III 
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY EXCLUDED EVIDENCE OF 
A FIRE WHICH OCCURRED TWO DAYS AFTER THE 
HOMICIDE FOR WHICH DEFENDANT WAS CONVICTED. 
Defendant claims that the trial court erred when it 
refused to allow defendant to introduce evidence of a fire in 
defendant's house which occurred two days after the shooting. 
Defendant has couched this argument in terms of rule 403, Utah 
Rules of Evidence, and in terms of a sixth amendment right to 
confront and cross-examine witnesses. However, the sixth 
amendment right is tempered by the rules of evidence. As 
defendant quoted in his brief: 
The Sixth Amendment right to confrontation 
requires only that the accused be permitted 
to introduce all relevant and admissible 
evidence. 
State v. Johns, 615 P.2d 1260, 1264 (Utah 1980) (emphasis added). 
If the evidence sought on cross-examination is irrelevant or 
inadmissible under the rules of evidence, defendant had no sixth 
amendment right to introduce it. 
It is well-settled that: 
[i]n reviewing evidentiary rulings made under 
rule 403, [an appellate court] will not 
overturn a trial court absent an abuse of 
discretion. State v. Cloud, 722 P.2d 750, 
752 (Utah 1986); State v. Garcia, 663 P.2d 
60, 64 (Utah 1983). To constitute an abuse 
of discretion, the error must have been 
harmful. See State v. Verde, 770 P.2d 116, 
120 (Utah 1989). 
State v. Larsen, 775 P.2d 415, 419 (Utah 1989). The pertinent 
rules of evidence read: 
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"Relevant evidence" means evidence having 
any tendency to make the existence of any 
fact that is of consequence to the 
determination of the action more probable or 
less probable than it would be without the 
evidence. 
Utah R. Evid. 401 (1990) (emphasis added). 
All relevant evidence is admissible, 
except as otherwise provided by the 
Constitution of the United States or the 
constitution of the state of Utah, statute, 
or by these rules, or by other rules 
applicable in courts of this state. Evidence 
which is not relevant is not admissible. 
Utah R. Evid. 402 (1990). 
Although relevant, evidence may be 
excluded if its probative value is 
substantially outweighed by the danger of 
unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or 
misleading the jury, or by considerations of 
undue delay, waste of time, or needless 
presentation of cumulative evidence. 
Utah R. Evid. 403 (1990). "Unfair prejudice" in this context was 
defined in Terry v. Zions Co-Operative Mercantile Institution, 
605 P.2d 314 (Utah 1979), overruled on other grounds, McFarland 
v. Skaqqs Co., Inc., 678 P.2d 298 (Utah 1984), as: 
Evidence is unfairly prejudicial in this 
context if it has a tendency to influence the 
outcome of the trial by improper means, or if 
it appeals to the jury's sympathies, or 
arouses its sense of horror, provokes its 
instinct to punish or otherwise causes a jury 
to base its decision on something other than 
the established propositions of the case. 
605 P.2d at 323, n. 31 (citation omitted). 
In the present case, the trial court did not abuse its 
discretion by refusing to allow introduction of evidence of a 
fire at defendant's house some two days after the shooting. That 
evidence had minimal relevance at best, and the trial court was 
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correct in ruling that its minimal relevance was substantially 
outweighed by its danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the 
issues, or misleading the jury. 
Defendant sought to introduce evidence of the fire, 
not, as he states in his brief, through an officer with knowledge 
of the fire, but through an officer who testified that he only 
knew about the fire from what he had read in the newspapers (Br. 
of App. at 26 and T. at 311; the transcript page is attached as 
Addendum B). During a subsequent recess, the admissibility of 
the fire evidence was argued, along with other admissibility 
issues (T. at 314-17 and 323; attached as Addendum B). The 
prosecutor argued that the fire was irrelevant, considering that 
it had occurred two days after the shooting, and at a time that 
defendant was incarcerated (T. at 314-15). There was no evidence 
that the fire was set by anyone associated with the victim, and 
it was misleading to imply that defendant left the scene of the 
shooting because of the fire (T. at 315). Defense counsel 
responded that evidence of the fire supported the defense theory 
that defendant fled the scene out of fear of retaliation (T. at 
315). The court responded that defendant was entitled to explain 
why he left, and defendant subsequently testified that he left 
because he was fearful of retaliation (T. at 315, 516-17, and 
552-53). But, as the court said, testimony of a fire two days 
later may have substantiated, somewhat, defendant's fear; 
however, that probative value was "somewhat limited." (T. at 
315-16). After discussion of other issues, the court said: 
I've ruled the fire is irrelevant. It may 
have some limited relevance, but it seems to 
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me that — the possible prejudicial value 
outweighs its relevance and I'm going to 
grant a motion in limine not to discuss the 
fire from this point on. 
(T. at 323; attached as Addendum B). 
This ruling was not an abuse of discretion. There is 
no claim that defendant shot Todd because he feared retaliation, 
and that that fear was then justified by the subsequent fire. 
The claim is only that the fire would somehow explain defendant's 
flight from the shooting. That flight was fully explained by 
defendant when he testified that he fled because he was afraid 
and because he was confused (T. at 516-17 and 552-53). The jury 
could easily accept that explanation of defendant's state of mind 
after the shooting without the additional testimony about a fire 
set to his house two days later, while he was still in jail. The 
attempt to elicit sympathy for defendant because his house was 
set afire, and to imply that Todd was an evil person whom 
defendant was justified in killing because Todd's associates 
later set the fire, is clearly asking the jury to base its 
decision about guilt en something other than the facts of the 
crime. The trial court correctly refused to allow the evidence. 
-42-
CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing, the State respectfully requests 
that this Court affirm defendant's conviction and sentence. 
RESPECTFULLY submitted this 9 — day of July, 1990. 
R. PAUL VAN DAM 
Attorney General 
CHARLENE BARLOW 
Assistant Attorney General 
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ADDENDA 
ADDENDUM A 
INSTRUCTION NO. "3 
You are to determine what witness to believe and what 
parts of their testimony you believe and what weight or value 
you place upon the testimony of the various witnesses. In 
making these determinations, you might like to consider some or 
all of the following: 
1) the demeanor and deportment of the witness in 
the courtroom; 
2) the witness1 interest in the result of the 
trial; 
3) any tendency to favor or disfavor one side or 
the other; 
4) the probability or improbability of events 
having occurred the way the witness describes 
the events; 
5) was the witness actually able to see or hear or 
otherwise perceive the things described; 
6) can this witness now accurately recall the 
things the witness observed; 
7) is the witness able to describe what he 
observed accurately and in a form that you can 
understand; 
8) did the witness make earlier statements or 
expressions which are consistent or inconsis-
tent with what is now being said; 
9) does the witness speak the truth or not. 
But whatever tests you use, the value of a witness1 
testimony is for you to determine. 
73 
INSTRUCTION NO. \ V) 
The weight of the evidence is not to be determined by 
the number of witnesses testifying on either side. You should 
consider all the facts and circumstances in evidence to determine 
which of the witnesses are worthy of greater believability. You 
may find that the testimony of a smaller number of witnesses on 
one side is more worthy of belief than the testimony of a greater 
number of witnesses on the other side. 
88 
INSTRUCTION NO. 
If you believe any witness has testified falsely as to 
any material fact in the case, you are at liberty to disregard 
the whole of the testimony of such witness* You are not bound to 
believe all that the witnesses may have testified to nor are you 
bound to believe any witness; you may believe one witness against 
many or many as against one. With this in mindr you are to judge 
what weight to give the testimony of the witnesses and to 
determine what the facts are. 
89 
INSTRUCTION NO. 
The constitution and laws of this state prohibit the 
trial judge from making any comment about the witnesses or the 
evidence, and I am not allowed to assist you in determining your 
verdict. 
Therefore, you are instructed that if during this trial 
I have said or done anything which has suggested that I favor the 
claims or position of either party, you are not to permit 
yourselves to be influenced by any such suggestion. 
I have not intended to indicate any opinion as to which 
witnesses are, or are not, worthy of belief, nor which party 
should prevail. If any expression of mine has seemed to indicate 
an opinion relative to any of these matters, you must disregard 
it. 
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ADDENDUM B 
311 
1 I MR. PHILLIPS: I think on the basis of that — he's 
2 indicated his non-presence at the house and I think that 
3 goes to the reason he was not at the house , Your Honor. 
4 THE COURT: Overruled. 
5 Q (By Mr. Phillips) Was there a fire the next day 
6 in the house? 
7 MS. KNOWLTON: Your Honor, I'm still going to 
g object. It happened the next day. It's not at that 
9 particular point of time. 
10 I MR. PHILLIPS: I still think that goes to the 
U feelings , the reason they vacated the house. 
12 MS. KNOWLTON: This officer was not present 
13 during that. 
14 THE COURT: I think the question was answered, 
15 but the material was objected to. 
16 I MR. PHILLIPS: Yes. 
17 THE COURT: And I suppose if he doesn't know 
18 I anything about the fire — 
19 I MR. PHILLIPS: And I didn't know if he said 
20 that. I thought his answer was at the time he was there 
21 
23 
24 
earlier. I don't know if he went back. If he didn't, 
22 he didn't, 
Q (By Mr. Phillips) Do you know anything about a 
fire? 
25 A Just what I read in the newspaper. 
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1 I available. 
2 THE COURT: I see. 
3 MR. RICHARDS: That will be the medical examiner, 
* THE COURT: Do you have other witnesses that 
5 might be called at this time? 
6 MS. KNOWLTON: Yes, Your Honor, another officer. 
7 MR. PHILLIPS: If we do go too fast I wouldn't 
8 mind calling my case and we could call them out of 
9 order. 
10 THE COURT: Okay. I think that might be an 
it appropriate thing to do, too. 
12 All right. Let's take a short recess. 
13 (WHEREUPON, at this time there was a recess, after 
14 which proceedings resumed in chambers with the Court and 
15 all counsel present, as follows:) 
16 MR. RICHARDS: Your Honor, we wanted to talk 
17 to you for a few moments. We're concerned with the 
18 line of questioning that began with the last officer 
19 in regards to this fire that occurred at the Pascual 
20 residence. 
21 The fire took place two days later on Monday 
22 morning. I don't see any relevancy in relating that 
23 fire to — to Mr. Pascual running because it happened 
24 long after the time that he had been apprehended and 
25 placed in jail. In fact, he was probably in jail at 
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1 that time. We have no idea who started the fire, but 
2 I to infer that for some reason the Salazar people are 
3 out to get him and that's the reason he's not turning 
4 himself in is, I think, a false impression and I'd like 
5 to get that straightened out now and not have it come 
6 out with the next officer. 
7 MR. PHILLIPS: We intend to pursue that because 
8 that is one of the reasons he left. Counsel constantly 
9 refers to the fact he didn't go back to the scene of 
10 the shooting and that he wasn't at the house, and I 
11 think the volatile situation was the very reason. They 
12 introduce things in evidence and they then — ask six 
13 or seven witnesses about it and I think I'm entitled 
14 to respond why he wasn't there and the fact that within 
15 two days there's an attempt to torch his house, his 
16 house is burned and threats are made I think responds 
17 to that. 
18 THE COURT: I think the risk is, of course, 
19 that — that the jury may be confused by that as going 
20 to the issue of whether he did or did not deal with 
21 what he's charged with doing. That would be the concern 
22 I have. 
23 Now, obviously I think he's entitled to explain 
24 why he left the scene, but I don't think that — I 
25 don't think the fire really has anything to do with that 
316 
1 I other than it may in some respects substantiate the 
2 fact that he — that his feelings were legitimate, but 
3 I fear that the prejudicial value from that may very 
4
 well outweigh its probative value because its probative 
5 value is somewhat limited. 
6 MR. PHILLIPS: I understand. 
1 THE COURT: So I — 
8 I MR. PHILLIPS: And I'll abide with what Your 
9 Honor says, obviously, but I do feel like that is 
10 supportive of the very feelings he had. 
11 THE COURT: He's entitled to express why he 
12 didn't come in and — but I think probably the matter 
13 of the fire may very well be — 
14 MR. PHILLIPS: I'm not sure it's any — I'm 
15 not quarreling, but I would like it in the record. 
16 I don't think it's any more prejudicial than 
17 interjecting the fact that this lady is pregnant, she 
18
 had another baby and they're living together. Those 
19 things are emotional things to present to the jury and 
20 have absolutely no bearing as to did he or did he not 
21 commit the offense. And I'm sure she's going to argue 
22 that thing to the jury and it hamstrings me if I can't 
23 reply to these emotional things. If they want to 
24 abandon that argument — 
25 MR. RICHARDS: I guess I don't see any tie-in 
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1 I there. 
2 MR. PHILLIPS: I think itfs an attempt to 
3 relate emotional — 
4
 THE COURT: I think if you would have objected 
5 at the time I probably would have sustained the 
6 objection# but because I don't think it has any — 
7 MR. PHILLIPS: Understand it puts me in a 
8 bad position if I object. 
9 THE COURT: I'm going to rule in limine they 
10 can't argue that to the jury. In the same respect, I 
11 won't allow you to bring up the fire. 
12 MR. PHILLIPS: I think that's fair. 
13 MR. RICHARDS: We hadn't intended to argue 
14 that because she had a baby for some reason this guy's 
15 guilty. Is that what you're saying? 
16 THE COURT: I think that was the implication. 
17 Right? 
18 MR. PHILLIPS: (Shakes head up and down.) 
19 I MR. RICHARDS: We do intend to argue that he's 
20 not like the other people in the — in the ruckus 
21 because here he's living at home with a girl that is 
22 in essence his common law wife, they have a family and 
23 he's in there watching television when all this 
24 happened which makes it unlikely he would be out in 
25 the middle of the fracas like these other kids were. 
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1 THE COURT: Yes. 
2 MR. PHILLIPS: What's his nickname? 
3 MS. KNOWLTON: Crewey. 
4 MR. PHILLIPS: Crewey. You're right. 
5 THE COURT: Crewey. 
6 I MR. RICHARDS: The issue we're here on is the 
7 fire. 
e THE COURT: I've ruled the fire is irrelevant. 
9 It may have some limited relevance, but it seems to 
10 me that — the possible prejudicial value outweighs 
H its relevance and I'm going to grant a motion in limine 
12 not to discuss the fire from this point on. I'm going 
13 to rule — reserve any ruling concerning this issue of 
14 cocaine in the system until we — until we are able 
15 to determine from the medical witness what the likely 
16 impact of that would be. 
17 MR. PHILLIPS: Are you also limiting this 
18 pregnant mother routine as far as 
19 THE COURT: Oh, yeah. Yeah. 
20 MR. RICHARDS: I have no intention of bringing 
2i that up. 
22 THE COURT: Okay. All right. 
23 MR. PHILLIPS: It just accidentally slipped 
24 into the case. 
25 THE COURT: I think they're entitled to say 
